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Abstract—Secure cryptographic protocols are indispensable
for modern communication systems. It is realized through an
encryption process in cryptography. In quantum cryptography,
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a widely popular quantum
communication scheme that enables two parties to establish a
shared secret key that can be used to encrypt and decrypt
messages. But security loopholes still exist in this cryptographic
protocol, as an eavesdropper can in principle still intercept all the
ciphertext to perform cryptanalysis and the key may get leaked
to the eavesdropper, although it happens very rarely. However,
there exists a more secure quantum cryptographic scheme known
as Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) protocol
that eliminates the necessity of key, encryption and ciphertext
transmission. It is a unique quantum communication scheme
where secret information is transmitted directly over a quan-
tum communication channel. We make use of measurement-
device-independent (MDI) protocol in this scheme where all
the measurements of quantum states during communication
are performed by a third party that can be untrusted or
even an eavesdropper. This eliminates all loopholes in practical
measurement devices. Here, we realize this MDI-QSDC protocol
using Bell and GHZ states in the IBM Quantum Experience
platform and implement swapping circuits for security check.
Index Terms—Entanglement swapping, Measurement-device-
independent (MDI) protocol, Quantum communication, Quan-
tum cryptography, Quantum secure direct communication
(QSDC), Superdense coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to ensure secure communication, various quan-
tum cryptographic schemes have been developed that makes
it rather impossible for the information to leak out to an
eavesdropper. During a communication process between two
parties that involves encryption and decryption process, a key
is required. Shor’s algorithm [18] makes it possible for an
eavesdropper to steal the key. In order to overcome this, a
very popular quantum cryptographic scheme, Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) is used which enables both the parties
to establish a shared secret key. Since Bennet and Brassard
introduced the BB84 protocol [15], a number of QKD pro-
tocols have been developed, most notably the Ekert protocol
[16]. However, there are still other security loopholes in the
QKD scheme. The eavesdropper can still intercept all the
ciphertext and perform cryptanalysis. Although rare, the secret
information may leak to the eavesdropper.
However, another ingenious quantum cryptographic scheme
known as the Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC)
protocol has been developed and several theoretical and ex-
perimental works [6]–[12] have been carried out on the same.
This scheme does not require key and encryption. It is a novel
secure communication system, without key distribution, key
storage and management, and ciphertext. This can offer sig-
nificant advantage in terms of security of communication, and
provides a great new alternative in the field of cryptographic
technology.
The notable distinction between the QSDC and QKD proto-
col is that the security is known only after the key distribution
session is completed in QKD, whereas QSDC first establishes
the security of the quantum channel. In practical quantum
communication systems, defects in measurement devices can
lead to leakage of secret information to an eavesdropper
without even being detected.
We can fix this problem using measurement-device-
independent (MDI) protocol. MDI-QKD [13], [14] and MDI-
QSDC [6] protocols have been developed and here we realize
the MDI-QSDC protocol using Bell and GHZ states in the
IBM Quantum Experience (IBM QE) platform to implement
the quantum circuits and compute the results. IBM QE, an
open-access platform for giving access to quantum simulators
and real chips, has been widely used recently to execute several
research works in the field of quantum simulation among
which, demonstration of path integral formalism [3], quantum
harmonic oscillator [19], [20], quantum gravity [21], Klein-
Gordon equation [22], quantum tunneling [23], observation of
Berry phase [24], variational quantum eigensolver [25] are a
few of them.
In the MDI-QSDC protocol, during the security check, we
make use of the swapping circuit to calculate the inner product
of two-qubit states that we developed in our previous paper
[3] to detect any act of eavesdropping.
II. MDI-QSDC PROTOCOL USING BELL STATES
We have two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, both
randomly prepare Bell states and an untrusted third party
Charlie who performs measurements. For our convenience
here, the Bell states prepared are any one of the following-
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) (1)
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) (2)
For both Alice and Bob, we prepare four Bell states as
follows-
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PREPARATION OF BELL STATES
Position Alice Bob
1 |ψ+〉 |ψ−〉
2 |ψ+〉 |ψ+〉
3 |ψ−〉 |ψ−〉
4 |ψ+〉 |ψ−〉
Now, we insert 1-qubit states of computational and
Hadamard basis at random positions of Alice and Bob-
TABLE II
RANDOM INSERTION OF 1-QUBIT STATES
Position Alice Bob
1 |ψ+〉 |ψ−〉
2 |+〉 |−〉
3 |ψ+〉 |ψ+〉
4 |ψ−〉 |ψ−〉
5 |0〉 |ψ−〉
6 |ψ+〉 |1〉
We assign one of the qubits from the Bell states at different
positions of Alice and Bob respectively to each of them
denoted by A and B respectively.
The other qubits of the pairs, along with the randomly
inserted 1-qubit states denoted by C and D respectively are
sent to Charlie, the third party in this protocol.
Bell basis measurements are now performed on the qubits
sent to Charlie. Charlie announces the results of the Bell basis
measurements. Due to entanglement swapping [1], the qubits
in A and B become entangled-
|ψ+〉AC ⊗ |ψ+〉BD =
1
2
[ |ψ+〉AB |ψ+〉CD
+ |ψ−〉AB |ψ−〉CD
+ |φ+〉AC |φ+〉BD
+ |φ−〉AC |φ−〉BD
]
|ψ+〉AC ⊗ |ψ−〉BD =
1
2
[ |ψ+〉AB |ψ−〉CD
+ |ψ−〉AB |ψ+〉CD
− |φ+〉AC |φ−〉BD
− |φ−〉AC |φ+〉BD
]
|ψ−〉AC ⊗ |ψ+〉BD =
1
2
[ |ψ+〉AB |ψ−〉CD
+ |ψ−〉AB |ψ+〉CD
+ |φ+〉AC |φ−〉BD
+ |φ−〉AC |φ+〉BD
]
|ψ−〉AC ⊗ |ψ−〉BD =
1
2
[ |ψ+〉AB |ψ+〉CD
+ |ψ−〉AB |ψ−〉CD
−ketφ+AC |φ+〉BD
− |φ−〉AC |φ−〉BD
]
(3)
From Table II, we can notice that, after Bell basis measure-
ment is performed on Charlie’s qubits, due to entanglement
swapping A and B in positions 1, 3, and 4 are entangled. The
single qubits in position 2 sent to Charlie are entangled to
form Bell state. We can easily see that-
|+−〉 = 1√
2
( |ψ−〉 − |φ−〉 ) (4)
The Bell basis measurement causes Charlie’s qubits in
position 2 to get entangled into any one of the Bell states given
in Eq. (4). The eavesdropper’s interception can change the
single qubits’ states and so a security check is now performed
on the Bell state in position 2.
After the security check, the error rate is estimated and if
it lies within an acceptable error rate, the communication be-
tween Alice and Bob can continue, otherwise, it is terminated.
Now, how do we make a security check using quantum circuits
to tell whether any eavesdropper has attempted to intercept or
not? We developed a technique using quantum circuits through
which it can be easily realized. We discuss this in the following
subsection.
Bell basis measurement in position 5 and 6 causes the qubits
sent to Charlie to become entangled due to entanglement
swapping, leaving behind single qubits in A and B which can
be understood from the following-
3|0〉C ⊗ |ψ−〉BD =
1
2
[ |ψ+〉CD |0〉B
+ |ψ−〉CD |0〉B
− |ψ+〉CD |1〉B
+ |ψ−〉CD |1〉B
]
|ψ+〉AC ⊗ |1〉D =
1
2
[ |0〉A |φ+〉CD
+ |0〉A |φ−〉CD
+ |1〉A |ψ+〉CD
− |1〉A |φ−〉CD
]
(5)
For simplicity of the protocol, positions 5 and 6, where
single qubits are left behind in A and B after Bell basis
measurement, are discarded.
A. Circuit implementation for Security Check
For security check, we make use of swapping circuit that
we have developed [3] for calculation of inner product of two
qubit states as shown symbolically in the figure below:
Fig. 1. Quantum swapping circuit for determining the inner product of two
qubit states
If the projection measurement is performed on the ancilla
qubits, the probability that it is in the state |00〉 is 12 (1 +| 〈ψ1|ψ2〉 |2).
Therefore, the inner product of |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 can be
calculated as 〈ψ1|ψ2〉 =
√
2P (|00〉)− 1, where P (|00〉) is
the probability that the ancilla qubits are in state |00〉.
We calculate the inner product of the initial qubits sent
to Charlie |+〉 and |−〉 with the entangled state in Charlie’s
possession. If the inner product is not within acceptable error
(this implies an interception attempt by an eavesdropper),
the communication between Alice and Bob is terminated.
Otherwise, the communication process is allowed to proceed.
The circuit implemented for calculating the inner product is
shown in the figure below-
Fig. 2. Circuit implemented for security check without eavesdropper inter-
ception
The projection measurement on the ancilla qubits gives the
following result-
Fig. 3. Histogram plot of the result for Run 1
The value of the inner product is given by-
√
2(P |00〉)− 1 = √2× 0.747− 1 = 0.70285
We make two more runs for this circuit in order to set an
acceptable error range-
4Fig. 4. Histogram plot of the result for Run 2
The value of the inner product is given by-
√
2(P |00〉)− 1 = √2× 0.755− 1 = 0.71414
Fig. 5. Histogram plot of the result for Run 3
The value of the inner product is given by-
√
2(P |00〉)− 1 = √2× 0.742− 1 = 0.69570
If the eavesdropper intercepts, this will lead to the 1-
qubit states that were randomly inserted into C and D in
position 2 to collapse into some other state and hence by
calculating the inner product, we can easily detect any attempt
of eavesdropping. Let us suppose that |+〉 in C changes to
|0〉 due to interception by the eavesdropper before Bell basis
measurement is made. The circuit implemented to demonstrate
the above is shown in the following figure-
Fig. 6. Circuit implemented for security check with eavesdropper interception
The projection measurement on the ancilla qubits gives us
the following result-
Fig. 7. Result of the measurement on ancilla qubits
The value of the inner product is given by-
√
2(P |00〉)− 1 = √2× 1− 1 = 1.00000
Again, due to eavesdropping suppose that |−〉 in D changes
to |0〉 before the Bell basis measurement is made. The cir-
cuit implemented to demonstrate the above is shown in the
following figure-
5Fig. 8. Circuit implemented for security check with eavesdropper interception
The projection measurement on the ancilla qubits gives the
following result-
Fig. 9. Result of the measurement on ancilla qubits
The value of the inner product is given by-
√
2(P |00〉)− 1 = √2× 0.633− 1 = 0.51575
Now, we make a table listing the error rates and deciding
whether to terminate or proceed with the communication
process.
TABLE III
SECURITY CHECK
S.No. Value Error rate Comm. status
1 0.70285 - Proceed
2 0.71414 0.016% Proceed
3 0.69570 −0.010% Proceed
4 1.00000 0.423% Terminate
5 0.51575 −0.266% Terminate
We observe that the inner product values whose error rates
are very low below a standard cutoff value, the communication
proceeds, otherwise it is immediately terminated.
B. Circuit implementation for Entanglement Swapping
We have already discussed how Bell basis measurements
on Charlie’s qubits leads to entangled pairs for Alice and Bob
due to entanglement swapping. These pairs in A and B form
an ordered sequence MA and MB respectively. Now in order
to send a message we apply a Z gate on Alice’s qubit whose
initial states are |ψ+〉. From Eq. (3), we can see that this is
equivalent to preparing all the initial states of Alice in the
|ψ−〉 state. So, MA only contains qubits whose initial states
are |ψ−〉 while MB contains qubits from both |ψ+〉 and |ψ−〉
states. The circuits implemented to realize the same is given
in the figures below-
Fig. 10. Circuit implementation for entangled state 1
6Fig. 11. Circuit implementation for entangled state 2
Fig. 12. Circuit implementation for entangled state 3
C. Circuit implementation for Superdense coding
We assume that after Bell basis measurement, due to en-
tanglement swapping the entangled state between Alice and
Bob is the Bell state |ψ+〉AB . We perform superdense coding
operations on Alice’s qubits in MA and randomly apply Z
gates on Bob’s qubits in MB to prevent the eavesdropper
from performing the intercept and resend attack. MA and MB
are now sent to Charlie, the third party, who now performs
Bell basis measurement and publishes the results. Now, we
implement the circuits for superdense coding operations with
and without applying Z gate on Bob’s qubits.
Fig. 13. Superdense coding circuit without applying Z gate on Bob’s qubit
On plotting the histogram for the probability of the qubits
received by Bob, we get-
Fig. 14. Histogram plot of the message received by Bob
Again, now after applying Z gate on Bob’s qubit we can
see how the message received by Bob changes.
7Fig. 15. Superdense coding circuit after applying Z gate on Bob’s qubit
Again, after plotting the histogram, we find the message
received by Bob.
Fig. 16. Histogram plot of the message received by Bob
Thus we notice that |11〉 becomes |01〉 after Z gate is applied
on Bob’s qubit. Similarly, we can check it for the other three
superdense coding operations. Since it is known only to Bob
where Bob has applied Z gates, Charlie cannot know the secret
message sent by Alice to Bob. After the results are published
by Charlie, Bob compares it with Alice to decode the message.
III. MDI-QSDC PROTOCOL USING GHZ STATES
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states are given by-
|ψ000〉 = 1√
2
[ |000〉+ |111〉 ]
|ψ001〉 = 1√
2
[ |000〉 − |111〉 ]
|ψ010〉 = 1√
2
[ |100〉+ |011〉 ]
|ψ011〉 = 1√
2
[ |100〉 − |011〉 ]
|ψ100〉 = 1√
2
[ |010〉+ |101〉 ]
|ψ101〉 = 1√
2
[ |010〉 − |101〉 ]
|ψ110〉 = 1√
2
[ |110〉+ |001〉 ]
|ψ111〉 = 1√
2
[ |110〉 − |001〉 ]
(6)
The protocol is basically similar to that of Bell state except
that two qubits are kept in Alice’s possession and one is sent
to Charlie while one qubit is kept in Bob’s possession and
two are sent to Charlie for Charlie to perform GHZ basis
measurement. We prepare Alice’s and Bob’s state in the |ψ000〉
and |ψ001〉 states and then single qubit states in computational
and Hadamard basis are inserted in random positions for Alice
and two qubit states for Bob which are sent to Charlie, the third
party.
TABLE IV
RANDOM INSERTION OF QUBITS
Position Alice Bob
1 |ψ000〉 |ψ000〉
2 |+〉 |+−〉
3 |ψ000〉 |ψ000〉
4 |ψ001〉 |ψ001〉
5 |0〉 |ψ000〉
6 |ψ000〉 |00〉
We assign two of the qubits for Alice and one qubit for Bob
of the GHZ states at different positions denoted by A1 and A2
for Alice and B for Bob. The other qubit from Alice’s GHZ
state along with the randomly inserted single qubit states are
sent to Charlie denoted by C1 while in Bob’s side the other
two qubits of the GHZ state along with the randomly inserted
two qubit states are sent to Charlie denoted by C2 and C3.
GHZ basis measurements are now performed on the qubits
sent to Charlie. Charlie announces the results of the GHZ basis
measurements. Due to entanglement swapping, the qubits in
A1, A2 and B become entangled-
8|ψ000〉A1A2C1 ⊗ |ψ000〉BC2C3
=
1
2
[ |ψ000〉A1A2B |ψ000〉C1C2C3
+ |ψ000〉A1A2B |ψ001〉C1C2C3
+ |ψ110〉A1A2B |ψ010〉C1C2C3
+ |ψ110〉A1A2B |ψ011〉C1C2C3
]
|ψ001〉A1A2C1 ⊗ |ψ001〉BC2C3
=
1
2
[ |ψ000〉A1A2B |ψ000〉C1C2C3
+ |ψ000〉A1A2B |ψ001〉C1C2C3
− |ψ110〉A1A2B |ψ010〉C1C2C3
− |ψ110〉A1A2B |ψ011〉C1C2C3
]
(7)
From Table IV, we can notice that, after GHZ basis measure-
ment is performed on Charlie’s qubits, due to entanglement
swapping A1, A2 and B in position 1, 3 and 4 are entangled.
The one and two qubit states in position 2 sent to Charlie are
entangled to form GHZ state. We can see that-
|+〉C1 ⊗ |+−〉C2C3 =
1
2
[ |ψ001〉C1C2C3
+ |ψ111〉C1C2C3
+ |ψ101〉C1C2C3
|ψ011〉C1C2C3
] (8)
The GHZ basis measurement causes Charlie’s qubits in
position 2 to get entangled into any of the GHZ states given
in Eq. (8). The eavesdropper’s interception can change the
state of the qubits in position 2 and hence a security check
is now performed on lines similar to security check in the
previous section. GHZ basis measurement in position 5 and 6
causes the qubits sent to Charlie to become entangled due to
entanglement swapping, leaving behind two qubits in A1 and
A2 and single qubit in B, which can be understood from the
following-
|0〉C1 ⊗ |ψ000〉BC2C3
=
1
2
[ |0〉B |ψ000〉C1C2C3
+ |0〉B |ψ001〉C1C2C3
+ |1〉B |ψ010〉C1C2C3
− |1〉B |ψ011〉C1C2C3
]
|ψ000〉A1A2C1 ⊗ |00〉C2C3
=
1
2
[ |00〉A1A2 |ψ000〉C1C2C3
+ |00〉A1A2 |ψ001〉C1C2C3
+ |11〉A1A2 |ψ010〉C1C2C3
+ |11〉A1A2 |ψ011〉C1C2C3
]
(9)
For simplicity of the protocol, the single qubit left behind
in B and the two qubits in A1 and A2, in position 5 and 6
respectively, are discarded.
A. Circuit implementation for Security Check
For security check yet again, we make use of swapping
circuit, now this time for calculation of three-qubit states as
shown symbolically in the figure below:
Fig. 17. Quantum swapping circuit for determining the inner product of
three-qubit states
On similar lines, as in the previous section, we calculate
the inner product of the initial qubits sent to Charlie |+〉 and
|+−〉 with the entangled state in Charlie’s possession. If the
inner product is not within acceptable error (this implies an
interception attempt by an eavesdropper), the communication
process between Alice and Bob is terminated. Otherwise, the
communication process is allowed to proceed.
B. Circuit implementation for Entanglement Swapping
We have already discussed how GHZ basis measurement
on Charlie’s qubits leads to entanglement between Alice’s and
Bob’s qubits. Each party form an ordered sequence MA and
MB respectively. Now, in order to send a message we apply
Z gate on anyone of Alice’s two qubits whose initial states
are |ψ001〉. From Eq. (7), we can see that this is equivalent
to preparing all the initial states of Alice in the |ψ000〉 state.
So, MA only contains qubits whose initial states are |ψ000〉
while MB contains qubits from both |ψ000〉 and |ψ001〉 states.
A circuit implemented for the realization of the same is shown
in figure below-
9Fig. 18. Circuit implementation for entangled state
C. Circuit implementation for Superdense coding
We assume that after GHZ basis measurement, due to
entanglement swapping the entangled state between Alice and
Bob is the GHZ state |ψ000〉A1A2B . We perform superdense
coding operations for three qubit states on Alice’s two qubits
in MA and randomly apply Z gate on Bob’s single qubits in
MB . MA and MB are now sent to Charlie, the third party,
who now performs GHZ basis measurement and publishes the
results. We implement a circuit to demonstrate the same.
Fig. 19. Superdense coding circuit
After plotting the histogram, we again find the message
received by Bob. Bob can then decode the message, as it is
known to him through superdense coding operations what
state Bob is supposed to receive before and after applying
the Z gate.
Fig. 20. Histogram plot of the message received by Bob
Similarly, we can check for all other superdense coding
operations. Since, it is only known to Bob where he has
applied Z gates, Charlie cannot know the secret message sent
by Alice to Bob. After the results are published by Charlie,
Bob compares it with Alice to decode the message.
IV. DISCUSSION
Here, we have realized the MDI-QSDC protocol by im-
plementing quantum circuits for Bell states in Sec. II and
for GHZ states in Sec.III. We make all the necessary cal-
culations required for security check and decide whether the
communication process should proceed or not. This can be
generalized for other maximally entangled states and quantum
circuits and the necessary protocols can be implemented for
those. The MDI-QSDC protocol solves the problem of defects
in practical measurement devices by eliminating the loopholes
in the measurement device while making the communication
process practically immune to interception by an eavesdropper.
This improves the security of communication between two
parties which is vital in modern-day communication systems.
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